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O n e of the symptoms of the incipient loss of 
confidence i n intellectual pursuits that is a fea-
ture of the age of h i g h technology is a lust o n the 
part of intellectuals to be demonstrably relevant. 
T h u s we read, w i t h s i n k i n g hearts, those inevit-
able little post-scripts to strikingly perishable 
papers w h i c h offer "Indications for further Re-
search" (which w i l l probably never be funded), 
or " Implicat ions for Pol icy M a k i n g " (which 
w i l l probably never be implemented), or "the 
Significance of Repl i ca t ion" (which w i l l proba-
bly go o n and on). M u c h of this has to do w i t h 
the hegemony of positivist methodology and 
w i t h the assembly l ine structure of academic 
careers. M u c h also has to do w i t h the infatuation 
w i t h technology itself and the arid and proble-
matic "object ivity" of the phi losophy of science 
w h i c h moulds and justifies quantitative preoc-
cupations. T h e one bright l ight of critical crea-
tivity penetrating this deceptively restless swamp 
is that cast by feminology and its increasingly 
innovative works. J i l l M c C a l l a Vickers, i n a 
recent paper, has argued pursuasively that the 
calculation of the quantity of female oppression 
is an important but l imited enterprise: moreover, 
it is an enterprise conducted w i t h i n parameters 
of intellectual enquiry w h i c h do not permit the 
formulat ion of urgent questions, never m i n d the 
provision of pol i t ical ly and culturally useful 
answers. 1 Vickers joins the progressive feminist 
quest w h i c h not only demands new theory, new 
method, new practice and, ultimately, a new 
wor ld , but also demands a radical critique of the 
standardized assumptions of the modes of enquiry 
developed by patriarchal science. Just as Mary 
Daly has led the way i n her passionately det-
ached appraisal of the presuppositions about the 
ability of man's language to interpret what is 
real , 2 Vickers launches a critique of such sacred 
bulls as objectivity itself.' Feminist research 
cannot be an examination of what Daly calls the 
"non-questions." Objectivity which objectifies 
women, takes away agency, ignores women's 
cultural achievements and relegates, for exam-
ple, the process of reproduction to the realm of 
mute brute nature: such objectivity is not able to 
describe adequately the experienced world , far 
less to change i t . 4 
A m u c h quoted phrase of Marx 's reminds us 
that a major critique of positivism has been 
launched from the Left, and many socialist fem-
inists are active i n the attempted renovation of 
M a r x i s m . T o be sure, the 19th century admira-
t ion for the scientific informed much of Marx's 
o w n work, and has devitalized m u c h of the 
research that invokes his authority. There is a 
methodological aspect to this impoverishment 
of course. T h e reduction of the theory of class 
struggle, for example, to a m u c h less revolution-
ary "confl ict theory" has not proven to be p o l i t i -
cally excidng nor intellectually frui t ful . 5 Further, 
the substitution of quantitative analysis for dia-
lectical logic has hardly enriched the analytical 
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enterprise. W i t h o u t a powerful sense of the his-
toric nature of reality, conflict theory tends to 
become an endless catalogue of the sins of capi-
talism hermetically sealed off f rom the creative 
Marxist not ion of praxis. M a r x i s m without dia-
lectical logic is i n fact indistinguishable from 
posi t iv ism. 6 
Dialectical logic is, i n my view, one of the 
developments of male-stream thought that may, 
i n a guarded way, be useful i n feminological 
analysis. M a n y feminists are currently c o m i n g to 
the conclusion that the central and perhaps most 
damaging tenet of male intellectual buccaneer-
i n g has been the pos i t ing of dual ism as the u n i -
versal essence of male constructions of reality. 
However, a crit ique of dual i sm was precisely the 
impetus to Hegel and Marx 's development of 
dialectical analysis. Central to their work was 
the proposi t ion that history is the product of 
h u m a n transcendence of the contradiction be-
tween the natural w o r l d and the social w o r l d . 7 
T h i s is by no means perceived by classical dialec-
tics, idealist or materialist, as permanent. O n the 
contrary, it is a relation w h i c h , by its very nature 
- and " M a n " is of nature - calls for active media-
t ion of its oppositions. " M a n " understands his 
dialectical integration w i t h and alienation from 
nature as a cal l for mediative praxis, w h i c h u n i -
fies thought and action i n an exercise i n control . 
T h u s , i n his efforts to mediate his aliented inte-
gration wi th the natural wor ld , " M a n " is forced 
to the activity of contro l l ing that relation con-
ceptually and practically, and of transcending it 
i n the progressive creation of new mediated rela-
tions w h i c h constitute the form and content of 
history. For Hegel , history is the temporal 
u n f o l d i n g and concretizing of the Spir i t of Rea-
son, whi le for M a r x it is the constitution of the 
social relations i n w h i c h " M a n " works out his 
appropriation and control of the natural wor ld 
i n the pursuit of economic survival. 
T h e movement of history is, i n both cases, a 
dialectical movement, a cancell ing and trans-
cending of the negativity and otherness embedded 
i n the man/nature contradiction. T h e problem 
for women is the perception of " M a n " as the 
created and creative Universal i n historical strug-
gles. T h i s w o u l d not be a problem if " M a n " was 
indeed a semantically slipshod but " rea l ly" true 
universal, that is, as a l l humanity, but this is not 
the case for either thinker. Hegel is the more 
hysterical misogynist of the two, but both of 
these extraordinary intellects persist i n identify-
i n g women w i t h nature, w h i c h is the mindless, 
absolutely objective and accidental part of the 
nature/history/man dialectic. 8 T h e relation of 
women to men is not therefore a dialectical con-
tradiction urging humanity to the historical 
practice of mediation and transcendence: it is 
ahistorical, outside of history and therefore out-
side of dialectical process. 
T h e perception of human existence as riven by 
dualisms has preoccupied Western thought since 
antiquity: the one and the many, appearance 
and reality, nature and culture, life and death 
have a l l made claims to be the fundamental 
dual ism, though m i n d and body is perhaps the 
most significant i n the annals of patriarchal 
ideology. There is, however, much controversy 
as to the primacy of particular modes of dual ism 
and little agreement as to the origins of dual ism. 
Nature herself, the gods, fate, history, necessity 
and the structure of m i n d itself have a l l been 
candidates. There is also little agreement as to 
how dual ism can be resolved. Idealists believe 
that mediation is only possible i n meditation 
and the integration of experience can therefore 
only be accomplished by phi losophica l elites on 
the model of Plato's Guardians. Over against 
this idealist dual ism, dialectics posits the not ion 
of contradiction. For Marx , contradiction is 
rooted i n necessity and is mediated historically 
and the greatest of these is class division, arising 
from the necessity to produce subsistance and 
mediated i n class struggle. 
I have argued elsewhere that the substructure 
of history cannot be rooted arbitrarily i n produc-
t ion, for the continuity of the race is a condit ion 
of history. T h e reproduction of the race, furth-
ermore, stands i n the classical form of universal 
to particular, the dialectical opposit ion of the 
reproduction of the species to the sustenance of 
the i n d i v i d u a l . 9 M a r x actually purloins the word 
" reproduct ion" for the latter part of this rela-
tion, on the grounds that it is w i t h i n the social 
relations of ind iv idua l survival - namely, the 
family - that general abstract labour power is 
concretized i n actual, particular labour. T h e 
u n p a i d labour of women which produces this 
labour power is not, i n Marx's schemata, unpaid 
at a l l . It is i n fact part of the major social factor 
(in early capitalism, the only social factor) w h i c h 
enters into the calculation of a social wage for 
labour. T h e value of labour is the value required 
to reproduce subsistence on a daily basis and 
guarantee a future labour force. 1 0 T h e capitalist, 
i n purchasing labour power, pays this price and, 
as far as he is able, not a penny more than bare 
cost of subsistence to the labourer and his fami l -
ia l dependents on w h o m the fate of capital 
depends. T h i s analysis is, of course, the bottom 
line of the theory of surplus value and its expro-
priat ion, and has also become the bottom l ine i n 
the endeavours of some Marxist feminists to ana-
lyze women's oppression as oppression by capi-
tal i n particular rather than as oppression by 
men i n general. 
I do not want to enter these contentious lists 
here. There is a large literature on the subject, 
and it is obviously very important i n terms of the 
objective problems associated with female par-
t ic ipation i n the work force. 1 1 However, I do not 
believe that the exploitation of women i n the 
work force can be resolved theoretically or prac-
tically whol ly w i t h i n the framework of class 
struggle w i t h i n an economic substructure. 1 2 
There is, as there has been throughout recorded 
history, a gender struggle going on w h i c h is 
both related to and independent of class struggle. 
Gender struggle s imply cannot be understood 
w i t h i n either r igidly economist or intransigently 
idealist constructs. 
T h e enterprise of elaborating the structure of 
the social relation of reproduction is enormously 
complex. Here, I want only to take u p two 
aspects of the analysis of reproductive relations 
i n a pre l iminary way. T h e first of these is the 
question of the i n d i v i d u a l i n class society. T h e 
second is the question of the creation of value by 
h u m a n reproductive labour. 
Histor ical ly , socialism, i n w h i c h conscious-
ness is grounded i n class relations, is the antithe-
sis of the Classical L ibera l doctrine of i n d i v i d u -
al ism, i n w h i c h consciousness is i n the first 
instance self-consciousness. Liberal ism.in its hey-
day as a revolutionary ideology, based its argu-
ments on the primacy of indiv idual freedom 
and, indeed, this battle st i l l goes on , as recent 
responses to the proposed Canadian B i l l of 
Rights show quite clearly. Feminists understand 
that they are seeking collective rights for women, 
yet are forced to do so i n a framework i n w h i c h 
rights are clearly perceived as inher ing i n the 
individual. T h e notion of Natural rights no 
doubt looked better i n the 18th century, when 
indiv idua l rights were a novel departure from 
the prevai l ing hierarchical world-view. Today, 
it is quite clear that liberal indiv idual i sm is 
pr imar i ly a possessive indiv idua l i sm, and that 
freedom is perceived as inher ing i n the mechan-
ics of the marketplaces of the free enterprise sys-
tem rather than i n the actual social relations of 
production. Freedom, i n the liberal view, depends 
u p o n the separation of private life and publ i c 
life, so that the "private enterprise" economy 
must move historically into the public realm, 
w h i c h is the locus of freedom, leaving the private 
realm to the intransigent necessities of biology 
and non-freedom, of "mere" use value rather 
than creative exchange value. In this way, free-
d o m may be considered to be a universal good 
grounded i n pol i t ical right and untouched by 
the particular economic privilege of individuals . 
T h i s contradiction is one w h i c h a capitalist r u l -
i n g class works hard to obscure, even to the 
extent of bestowing i n d i v i d u a l rights o n women 
whose " n a t u r a l " habitat i n the private realm 
constrains them from u t i l i z i n g these rights by 
active participation i n the publ ic realm. 
Nonetheless, the contradiction is real, and i n 
fact the private d o m a i n plays an important part 
i n the classical perception of men's pol i t ical 
freedom and i n the practical exercise of male 
social control . What ameliorates the proble-
matic nature of p o l i t i c a l freedom standing 
against the need to impose pol i t i ca l obl igat ion 
and defend economic inequality - the o l d prob-
lem w h i c h contract theory failed to solve - is 
Man 's right to absolute freedom i n and control 
of the private domain . Rousseau was the first to 
see the necessity and possibil ity of such a devel-
opment, and to argue, somewhat obliquely, that 
the non-freedom of women was the pre-condition 
of the freedom of male citizens. 1 3 It is thus not at 
a l l surpris ing to see the ideology of l iberalism i n 
its dotage appear i n the form of conservatism, 
the so-called new right, desperately hanging o n 
to the realization that freedom i n publ ic rests on 
domestic privation, and f ight ing strenuously to 
conserve the forms of private life w h i c h it cannot 
admit that the private enterprise system has i n 
fact destroyed. Just as ancient conservatives l ike 
Hesiod and Plato saw women as the destroyers of 
Man's Golden Age, so latter day conservative 
l iberalism sees feminism as the destructive force 
attacking the family, that institution w h i c h lays 
the Golden Eggs of suitably socialized wage 
labourers. Central to this perception of the fam-
i ly , of course, is the mediat ion of the separation 
of publ ic and private life and of collective and 
general interests by male control of reproduc-
tion, w h i c h provides a "universal i ty" which 
capitalist economics and liberal politics cannot. 
Margaret Stacey and M a r i o n Price have drawn 
attention to the fact that the major part of the 
women's struggle i n liberal democracies has 
centred around the struggle for i n d i v i d u a l c i v i l 
rights: they also note that this struggle has been 
successful, but i n a very obl ique way. T h e bes-
towal of ind iv idua l rights u p o n women comes 
from a male-dominated pol i ty w h i c h refuses to 
create the social conditions that w o u l d permit 
women to translate indiv idual rights into collec-
tive pol i t i ca l power. A t the same time, the state, 
as the instrument of patriarchal and bourgeois 
power, steadily erodes the private domain , leav-
i n g women without their tradit ional " o w n 
place," however unsatisfactory, whi le it care-
ful ly denies them real clout i n the publ ic rea lm. 1 4 
Something similar happens i n the Trade U n i o n 
movement, i n education and i n other significant 
social institutions. T h e denial of reproductive 
rights i n practice, whatever the law says, is also 
predicated o n the not ion that " r i g h t " belongs i n 
the publ ic realm, while the private realm remains 
the realm of necessity. Marx ism properly empha-
sized necessity as the ground of the social rela-
tions of production, but production, for both 
liberal and Marxist economics, is the production 
of exchange value: exchange is the social interac-
t ion i n w h i c h the value of labour is realized. For 
M a r x , " reproduct ion" is the individual repro-
duct ion of abstract social labour, a properly con-
stituted dialectical contradiction w h i c h some-
h o w also reproduces the race. T h e not ion of a 
specific value as a product of reproductive 
l a b o u r is total ly absent f r o m male-stream 
thought. 
T h e whole dualist structure of individual and 
race is but one shade i n the rainbow of dual i sm 
w h i c h arches over patriarchal understanding of 
the wor ld . W h e n it is denied, as feminists deny it, 
for example, i n the c la im that the personal is 
pol i t i ca l , the age-old separation of publ ic/pr i -
vate is also denied. Smal l wonder that this seem-
ingly rather naive and indeterminate slogan 
excites m u c h anguish i n the hearts not only of 
the r u l i n g class, but of the r u l i n g sex. It may not 
yet be entirely clear what it actually means to say 
that the personal is pol i t ical . Obviously it means 
such things as control of one's personal sexuality 
and reproductive choice: these are sti l l claimed 
as ind iv idua l rights, and early formulations of 
the not ion that the personal is pol i t i ca l had a 
strongly i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , d o - y o u r - o w n - t h i n g 
slant. Feminism is now transcending the extreme 
indiv idual i sm of the 1960s i n both theoretical 
and strategic ways, developing, for example, 
practical re-arrangements of the domestic respon-
sibilities, c l a i m i n g new and adequate social sys-
tems of c h i l d care and domestic labour as po l i t i -
cal priorities, and organizing constitutional acti-
vity around both ind iv idua l rights and the 
collective interests of women. Even these rela-
tively modest efforts are radical, as the revival of 
now conservative l iberalism to oppose them 
powerfully demonstrates. T h e politics of the 
personal challenges the doctine of indiv idual 
freedom, though it does so i n a sti l l confused 
way. It says i n effect that the dogma of individual 
freedom is a fraud because women are systemati-
cally excluded. T h i s upsets liberals. It also says 
that indiv idual freedom i n general is a fraud 
because patriarchy is universal and oppressive. 
T h i s upsets Marxists, and upsets them even 
more when it is further suggested that patriarchy 
is the m a i n enemy 1 5 and that sexism must be 
destroyed before we can even think of the possib-
i l i t y of the e l iminat ion of class. 1 6 
Clearly, the question of the indiv idual and her 
or his ontological status is a l l ied to these confus-
i n g social and pol i t ical struggles. It is an onto-
logical question precisely because the opposi-
tion of ind iv idua l and community is an a priori 
of the dualist view of reality w h i c h patriarchy 
has nourished for centuries: the bottom line, as 
H a n n a h Arendt argues, of the h u m a n condi-
t i o n . 1 7 Levi-Strauss's structuralism also rises on 
this foundation; Levi-Strauss argues that it is 
quite inconsequential what you call this antag-
onism - he favours nature versus culture - the 
opposit ion of Universal and Particular is the 
ground of a l l theories and practices of h u m a n 
history. 1 8 T h e labyrinth of questions raised by 
this pr imordia l dual i sm is a question for intel-
lectual historians. What I have argued is that 
dual ism is neither a pr imordia l nor a sensory nor 
a theological perception i n an a priori sense, but 
is i n fact a specifically masculine reality rooted 
i n the material realities of reproductive process. 
Reproductive process alienates men from nature 
at the moment of ejaculation of semen. " M a n , " 
reproductively, is Universal only i n the most 
undifferentiated way: any man may have fathered 
this c h i l d . M a n is also alienated from the conti -
nuity of the generations for, as T .S . E l io t knows, 
"between the conception and the creation falls 
the shadow," the shadow presumably of uncer-
tainty and lapsed time. M a n can only mediate 
his al ienation from c h i l d and species culturally 
and historically i n co-operative action w i t h 
other men, and this, of course, is precisely what 
men have done i n the actual conversion from 
k i n s h i p organization to rational/legal institu-
tions. Paternity is pr imordia l ly a conception, an 
ideology of power over nature divorced from any 
ensured relation w i t h nature. 
M e n therefore constitute themselves histori-
cally as a - indeed as the - Universal category, and 
Hegel's argument that women's inferiority i n -
heres precisely i n their inabi l i ty to rise above 
particularity is nonsense. Insofar as the feminine 
is particular (this w o m a n - Eve - Mary - Jezebel 
-the whore of Babylon - you, me) she is particu-
lar not by virtue of Natural L a w but by virtue of 
patriarchal theory and practice. T h i s praxis 
transforms uncertain and alienated paternity to 
a coherent and powerfully integrated patriarchy; 
it also transforms the mediative funct ion of 
reproductive labour power. T h i s labour power, 
w h i c h i n fact cancels the contradiction between 
people and nature, between ind iv idua l and race, 
and between past and present: this power is cu l -
turally attenuated to a particular, private func-
t ion taking its generality only from the " u n i n -
teresting" realm of biology, and undifferentiated 
from animal reproductive process i n general. 
D u r i n g this l o n g development, i n w h i c h 
A d a m has consistently abused his divine gift of 
n a m i n g things - w h i c h may have been exactly 
what his metaphysically, non-biological ly pro-
creating father and judge intended - a cultural 
and theological complex has arisen to define 
M a n as universal, the participant i n p u b l i c life, 
the realm of freedom, and to define women as 
particular, as denizens only of the private realm, 
the realm of necessity. It is this complex w h i c h 
feminology now seeks to analyse and feminism 
seeks to transform. It is not argued here that 
biological process determines history. It is argued 
that reproductive process, l ike productive pro-
cess, creates the need among the people of the 
w o r l d to set u p certain sets of social relations to 
mediate the contradictions w h i c h both realms of 
necessity generate. 
It is i n this context, a dialectical context but 
not recognizably a Marxist context, that we must 
note the crucial nature of value to both realms. 
M a r x defines labour as the product ion of 
value, but restricts this def ini t ion to that interac-
t ion of man and the natural wor ld called produc-
t ion and the social def ini t ion and measurement 
of value i n the social process of exchange. As far 
as the labour of reproduction is concerned, as has 
been noted, this is understood as household 
work w h i c h reproduces abstract labour power i n 
useful form, i n capital ism the form of labour as 
commodity. T h e problematics of this formula-
tion were never questioned unt i l feminism started 
to do so i n the last few decades. But the actual 
labour of biological reproduction, the labour 
w h i c h is " l a b o u r " to the women who do it, the 
hard, p a i n f u l task of producing a new i n d i v i d -
ual and ensuring that the race continues: this 
magnificent act of mediation is not labour at a l l , 
according to male-stream thought. It is i n v o l u n -
tary, or has been largely so u n t i l recently; it is 
biological ly determined; it is mindless. Above 
a l l , it does not create value. T h i s does not mean, 
of course, that chi ldren have no value. It has not 
even meant that they have not had both use and 
exchange value. Whatever value the c h i l d has, 
however, is not perceived as a value created by 
women's reproductive labour, but a value be-
stowed by generous fathers, spiritual and secu-
lar. In l iberal ideology it inheres i n the i n d i v i d -
ual s imply by virtue of his ind iv idua l i sm and, if 
he is male and lucky, by what he inherits from 
his father i n the way of property rights. T h e 
confusion of h u m a n value and economic value 
persists i n socialism, for the child's h u m a n 
worth w i l l be determined by his class or, mil le-
nial ly , his classlessness. In practice, communism 
has not let individuals stand i n the way of the 
historical dialectic, yet seems unable to trans-
cend the symbolic and practical representation 
of indiv idual i sm found i n personality cults of 
leadership. 
I am not advocating that chi ldren be equated 
w i t h commodities: I am arguing that children 
have a value which is, l ike a l l value, produced by 
h u m a n labour. I a m not arguing, either, that we 
should feel more love for our kids, for a fair 
number of kids do get to be loved. T o be sure, 
feminists need not be afraid of analysing a possi-
ble relation between the i m p l i c i t proposit ion 
that reproductive labour produces no value and 
the violat ion of h u m a n bodies w h i c h is the dark 
underside of patriarchal culture. What must be 
challenged, however, is not a collection of atti-
tudes and behaviours, but a much deeper strain 
i n which ontology, epistemology and ethics con-
j o i n i n male interpretation and control of the 
wor ld . 
Ethics. Norms. Values. Women are rightly 
suspicious of these concepts, for it is now a tru-
ism that ethics are created by the powerful , i n 
terms of both class and gender. "V a lue s , " the 
word w i t h w h i c h social science tries to make 
ethics objective and neutral, have been, histori-
cally, the self-interest of the few imposed u p o n 
the many. T h i s does not mean that a l l proposi-
tions about the good must be rejected. M o r a l 
relativism and moral n i h i l i s m are themselves 
ethical positions. Yet feminism has not embraced 
these counsels of despair. Feminism has critic-
ized patriarchal values, i n c l u d i n g the empty 
veneration of motherhood and the notion that 
women must somehow f u l f i l l the role of guard-
ians of an ethical system w h i c h they have not 
created. A t the same time, feminists have increas-
ingly taken positions on ethical issues, not only 
i n terms of the injustice of women's position, but 
i n terms of what is seen as patriarchy's inherent 
lust for violent solutions to pol i t ical and per-
sonal problems. If the personal is pol i t ica l , 
domestic violence is morally as wrong as impe-
rialist aggression, and the control of nature is 
perceived by many feminists as immora l when it 
passes from creative interaction to wanton des-
truction. There is no logical reason why the 
relations of nature/history, individual/species, 
particular/universal should not be mediated by 
social relations actively and consciously grounded 
i n the integrative mediations of real reproduc-
tive labour, rather than i n the alienated relations 
of the idea of paternity. 
T h e word " v a l u e " is not i n fact neutral: it 
s imply confuses economic and moral value. 
T h i s no doubt owes much to the conceptual 
hegemony of the great men of the market place, 
the ethics of what's good for General Motors 
being good for a l l of us. Yet the question of the 
actual grounding of ethics is one of history's 
great puzzles. Many ethical propositions share 
wi th patriarchy a history much older than capi-
talism. Many of them i n fact are women centred 
and women created, especially those related to 
children and personal well-being. T h i s is one 
reason why they are perceived as pretty but not 
practical and certainly not b inding . I w o u l d 
argue that i n fact the proposit ion that the per-
sonal is pol i t ical is also an argument that the 
person is moral . T h i s w o u l d simply be an arbi-
trary pronouncement if it were not able to posit a 
material grounding for moral positions. The use 
of the word value i n its double sense suggests one 
possible way of dealing wi th this. Value is i n fact 
social, even where divine inspirat ion is adduced. 
Social value is created by labour. If this is true of 
productive value, why should it not be true of 
reproductive value? What, then, is the value 
created by reproductive labour? 
It is a value w h i c h I have called, tentatively, 
synthetic value. 1 9 U n l i k e imposed value systems, 
it does not perceive value i n a dualist way, for the 
reproductive labour of women is essentially 
mediative and integrative. T h e birth of the c h i l d 
is obviously an alienation of a material nature as 
specific as the alienation of the male seed. T h e 
difference is, of course, that the latter is ideologi-
cally and culturally mediated by man, whi le the 
former is mediated, as a l l transcendent media-
tions must be, by h u m a n labour, women's 
labour. T h e two-sidedness of patriarchal notions 
of value - the material, quantifiable, exchangea-
ble economic value over against the abstract, 
qualitative fixed ethical value - presents material 
value as concrete and more desirable i n practice, 
if not i n rhetoric. The system of moral values 
w h i c h is predicated on material gain is clearly 
immensely problematic where the universal crea-
t ion of value by labour power is w i l f u l l y de l im-
ited by the pol i t ical and economic control of the 
appropriat ing few. Nonetheless, i n any conceiv-
able form of economic relations, what has to be 
mediated by men and women alike is the actual 
separation of the human and natural wor ld . 
Reproductive labour has a quite different 
mediation to perform and a quite different value 
to produce. T h e dialectical contradictions w h i c h 
reproductive labour mediates and synthesises are 
the separation of the generations, w h i c h is a 
temporal mediation and as such the substructure 
of history, and the generic contradiction, the gap 
between male alienation f rom and female inte-
gration w i t h reproductive process, w h i c h is the 
ground of the social relations of reproduction. 
T h e dialectical relation of production and repro-
duction is s imply not visible under historical 
circumstances i n w h i c h reproduction appears as 
involuntary and accidental. Just as technology 
historically transforms means of production, so 
contraceptive technology, currently about as 
sophisticated as the water wheel, renders the 
actual dialectical and historical dimension of 
reproductive process visible and thus subject to 
analysis. Likewise, the question of the value of 
both ind iv idua l and genetic life takes on a moral 
dimension: not "what is one life worth?" , not 
" d o we regard the survival of the race as a moral 
good rather than a random act of natural selec-
t ion?", but a realization that these are ultimately 
the same question. 
T h i s is a question of the value of Be- ing as 
such, the challenge to the ontological exile of 
women of w h i c h Vickers speaks. It is the root of 
her perception of methodological revolt by wo-
men, for we do not have the analytical tools to 
deal w i t h it. I have posed the question here i n 
dialectical terms, but have quite unrepentantly 
bent those terms to encompass female experience 
i n a way that male dialecticians w i l l no doubt 
deride. Meanwhi le , they persist i n strategies of 
control of the natural w o r l d , i n c l u d i n g the 
minds and bodies of women and children, rather 
than p u r s u i n g a polit ics of integration founded 
o n the synthesis of people and nature w h i c h is 
materially mediated by the creation of life-
creating value by reproductive labour. T h e deri-
sion comes w i t h the historical and ideological 
package w h i c h feminology n o w has the task of 
transcending. It is a frighteningly diff icult task, 
but no more so than the female task of transcend-
i n g natural and cul tural blocks to species conti-
nuity w h i c h women have been battl ing for a very 
long time indeed. 
T h e ultimate value created by reproductive 
labour is h u m a n life itself: l ife i n a l l the dialecti-
cal complexity of i n d i v i d u a l and community . 
T h e cul tural expression of the value of life has 
not been made by the women whose labour 
power creates it: it has been made by an alienated 
sex w h o have invented such bizarre notions 
as the cheapness of life, death as true birth, the 
individual is t ideology of the self-made man and 
the existential vo id w h i c h gobbles up those w h o 
have forgotten that they are the products of 
reproductive labour. They prefer to think of 
themselves as " f a l l e n " into the wor ld , l ike H e i -
degger's Dasein. They do not i n fact fa l l f rom 
eternity into time, for these two dimensions are 
mediated i n women's reproductive labour. 
Nonetheless, " l i f e " is merely another abstrac-
t ion if we do not give it social substance, and 
define the dimensions of its value i n concrete 
ways. O n a much more pragmatic level, for 
example, I w o u l d argue that h u m a n life has a 
value only insofar as it is the product of repro-
ductive labour, and it therefore makes no sense to 
speak of a fetus as a person. N o h u m a n labour, 
no value. I w o u l d also argue that the ancient 
equality debate can be conducted more rigor-
ously w i t h i n a materialist formulat ion of the 
social relations of reproduction. T h e h u m a n 
value imbued i n each of us is not only a personal 
value, but a species value conferred by the 
socially mediative and creative character of repro-
ductive labour. 
In other words, I w o u l d recommend that fem-
in ism elaborate a value system which is grounded 
i n the materiality of labour-created value, w h i c h 
is life centred i n terms of i n d i v i d u a l and race, 
w h i c h clarifies new, vibrant and ethical social 
relations of reproduction, and understands such 
relations i n opposit ion to and integration w i t h 
the dialectically structured relations of produc-
t ion as the essential substructure of our past and 
of our future. 
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